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Brexit	has	blown	open	the	unreconciled	divisions	in
Northern	Ireland
The	British	and	Irish	governments	have	long	tried	to	keep	a	lid	on	the	tensions	in	Northern
Ireland.	But	Brexit,	argues	Duncan	Morrow	(Ulster	University)	has	exposed	the	weaknesses
of	the	Good	Friday	and	St	Andrew’s	Agreements	–	deals	that	never	required	each	side	to	give
up	their	aims	of	ruling	Northern	Ireland	alone.	Now	these	unreconciled	political	narratives	are
exposed	again	to	the	outside	world.	The	question	of	whether	Brexit	shapes	the	future	of
Northern	Ireland,	or	Northern	Ireland	shapes	Brexit,	is	still	completely	unresolved.
‘Northern	Ireland’	came	into	being	more	as	a	tactic	than	a	goal.		Originally,	it	was	a	British	innovation	to	manage	a
breakdown	in	legitimacy	in	Ireland	that	threatened	to	escalate	beyond	control.		Ulster	Unionists	adopted	the
cause	of	‘Northern	Ireland’	only	belatedly	–	when	it	became	their	best	available	option	to	maintain	their	own
political	voice.		But	even	they	saw	it	as	an	instrument	to	a	protect	their	British	identity	against	Irish	nationalism
rather	than	an	end	in	itself.
Although	no	Irish	nationalists	wanted	Northern	Ireland,	a	majority	in	the	South	eventually	acquiesced	in	its
pragmatic	value,	to	the	point	of	defending	the	settlement	in	their	own	civil	war.	Northern	Nationalists	–	required
not	only	to	accept	partition	but	to	live	on	the	Unionist	side	of	it	–	never	accepted	it,	and	were	in	a	position	to	resist
in	many	parts	of	the	new	experiment.	But	while	Northern	Ireland	miraculously	removed	British-Irish	tensions	from
the	rest	of	Britain	and	Ireland,	it	embedded	sectarian	antagonism	within.
Sinn	Féin	MLAs	at	an	Acht	na	Gaeilge	(Irish	Language	Act)	protest	at	Stormont.	Photo:	Sinn
Féin	via	a	CC-BY	2.0	licence
Northern	Ireland’s	intractability	was	the	obvious	reason	why	everyone	outside	it	made	every	effort	to	stop
themselves	from	becoming	entangled	in	it.	Paradoxically,	its	suspicions	and	antagonism	were	also	its	most
obvious	badge	of	distinctiveness.	Chronic	hostility	was	Northern	Ireland’s	identity,	creating	its	own	‘normal’,	its
own	rituals,	structures,	habits	and	political	narratives.	Northern	Ireland	was	the	’container’	in	every	sense:		it
contained	(constrained)	violence	between	Britain	and	Ireland,	but	also	contained	its	own	internal	violence.	
Northern	Ireland	still	has	both	a	persistent	identity-deficit	and	is	more	clearly	distinctive	than	everywhere	around
it.	But	the	biggest	difference	was	now	no	longer	between	Britain	and	Ireland,	but	between	inside	and	outside	the
antagonism.
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Containment	depended	on	two	conditions:		the	antagonism	must	not	escalate	into	open	violence,	thus	rendering	it
deniable	–	and,	on	that	basis,	outside	powers	could	sidestep	Northern	Ireland	while	attending	to	their	own
dealings.	When	Northern	Ireland’s	tensions	escalated	rapidly	into	a	vortex	of	murderous	violence	between	1968
and	1972,	Britain	and	Ireland	found	themselves	unwillingly	drawn	back	to	their	unresolved	historic	dilemma.
It	took	until	1985	for	the	British	and	Irish	government	to	recast	the	Northern	Irish	crisis	as	a	problem	requiring
inter-governmental	leadership.	‘Reconciliation’	in	Northern	Ireland	became	the	basis	for	a	historically	new
partnership	between	London	and	Dublin,	with	active	support	from	Europe	and	America.	Problematically,	the
principle	of	rapprochement	had	few	takers	in	Northern	Ireland.	Nonetheless,	after	13	years	of	effort,	and	despite
many	ups	and	downs,	the	majority	of	Northern	Ireland’s	politicians	signed	up	in	principle	in	Belfast	on	Good
Friday	1998.
The	Agreement	was	endorsed	by	72%	of	Northern	Irish	voters	–	compared	to	Brexit,	an	overwhelming	mandate.
But	while	it	affirmed	the	broad	consensus	that	consent,	power-sharing	and	non-violence	were	essential	to
institutional	stability	in	the	present,	they	were	only	made	possible	by	limiting	efforts	to	resolve	the	conundrums	of
either	the	past	or	the	future.		The	legacy	of	violence	was	declared	‘tragic	and	regrettable’,	yet	the	Agreement	was
studiously	neutral	on	the	question	of	responsibility	or	blame.	Although	all	sides	committed	“to	strive	in	every
practical	way	towards	reconciliation	and	rapprochement”,	each	did	so	without	being	required	to	change	anything
about	their	aspirations	to	rule	Northern	Ireland	alone.	So	while	the	document	was	accommodating	in	its	design,
the	signatories	–	especially	those	in	Northern	Ireland	–	could	sign	it	while	remaining	single-mindedly	committed	to
diametrically	opposed	views	of	both	past	and	future.	For	its	strongest	champions	in	Dublin,	London,	Washington
and	Brussels,	reconciliation	was	a	strategic	‘new	beginning’.		For	many	of	its	signatories	in	Belfast,	reconciliation
was	a	compromise	tactic,	not	to	be	mistaken	for	an	ultimate	goal.
The	history	of	Northern	Ireland	since	1998	was	inevitably	also	the	history	of	the	rise	and	fall	of	reconciliation.		For
the	first	nine	years	after	signing,	hopes	of	implementing	stable,	shared	political	institutions	were	slowly	dashed	as
Unionists	and	Republicans	faced	off	over	the	question	of	who	should	first	demonstrate	their	good	faith.	Unionist
demands	that	Republicans	disarm	before	participating	in	government	were	met	with	Republican	insistence	that
disarmament	would	only	follow	evidence	of	change	in	the	nature	of	government.
As	polarisation	set	in	again,	the	British	and	Irish	governments	subtly	re-calibrated	the	Agreement	at	St	Andrews	in
2006.	‘Peace’	was	stripped	back	to	its	pragmatic	essential	of	viable	institutions,	rather	than	new	relationships.		To
this	end,	the	government	watered	down	the	requirement	for	mutual	endorsement	by	the	parties	in	government
and	downplayed	the	importance	of	equality	law,	integrated	education,	shared	housing,	civic	forums,	bills	of	rights
or	a	shared	future.		All	that	was	required	now	was	evidence	of	disarmament	by	the	IRA,	commitment	to	the
policing	arrangements	by	Sinn	Fein	and	commitment	to	operate	North-South	institutions	and	to	devolve	powers
for	policing	and	justice	at	a	future	date	by	the	Democratic	Unionists.
In	2007,	the	prize	of	partnership	government	was	finally	achieved.		Previously	unthinkable	pictures	of	past
enemies	smiling	in	harmony	seemed	to	seal	a	new	deal.	With	shared	government	established	and	the	rule	of	law
in	place,	Northern	Ireland	was	removed	from	the	front	line	of	international	and	intergovernmental	interest	and
declared	resolved.
On	the	surface,	reconciliation	had	triumphed	over	division.	But	by	stepping	away,	the	governments	chose	to
ignore	the	evidence	that	power	had	been	returned	to	parties	for	whom	reconciliation	was	a	method,	or	a	tactic,
never	the	goal.		Now	that	government	was	re-established	in	Belfast,	both	Ireland	and	the	UK	could	at	last	become
less	interested	in	the	quality	of	partnership	than	in	its	existence.
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To	the	outside	world,	the	symbol	of	shared	government	and	the	continuity	of	government	spelled	progress.	But
internally,	the	Executive	was	subject	to	repeated	breakdowns	over	unresolved	issues	of	responsibility	for	killing
and	contentious	cultural	symbols,	and	made	no	progress	on	delivering	an	integrated	rather	than	segregated
future.		The	permanent	crisis	was	replaced	by	repeated	mini-crises	over	policing,	flags,	parades,	the	past,
paramilitaries	and	language.	Constitutional	instruments	designed	to	ensure	inter-community	fairness	became
vehicles	for	single-party	veto.	Almost	every	year	since	2010,	the	situation	required	outside	intervention.		In	each
case,	the	consistent	priority	of	both	London	and	Dublin	was	to	restore	institutions	rather	than	take	additional
responsibility	to	address	unresolved	issues	at	depth.	For	as	long	as	devolution	could	be	restored,	the	welcome
and	radical	reduction	in	violence	in	Northern	Ireland	meant	that	any	challenges	to	reconciliation	were	technical
rather	than	systemic.
This	time,	the	continuing	weakness	of	the	1998	framework	in	the	face	of	national	antagonism	has	been	starkly
revealed.	Although	the	immediate	focus	of	local	political	attention	was	a	breakdown	over	Assembly	accountability
brought	on	by	revelations	of	serious	financial	problems	with	a	Renewable	Heating	Initiative	(RHI),	the	fragility	of
inter-community	partnership	was	exposed	when	relations	took	on	sectarian	overtones	after	Sinn	Fein	withdrew
from	the	Executive.	Sinn	Fein’s	advances	among	nationalist	voters	in	February	were	followed	by	a	swing	to	the
DUP	among	Unionists	in	the	Westminster	elections	in	June,	elections	that	catapulted	the	DUP	into	a	pivotal
position	in	London.
But	it	is	increasingly	clear	that	the	additional,	and	dramatic,	new	element	is	not	local,	but	the	enormous	stress
being	put	on	the	British-Irish	framework	underpinning	the	Good	Friday	system	as	a	result	of	Brexit.		For	the	first
time	since	1985,	the	governments	of	the	UK	and	Ireland	have	adopted	radically	different	approaches	to	the
fundamental	underpinnings	of	the	Agreement:		sovereignty,	borders	and	citizenship.		Alongside	the
disappearance	of	European	and	American	sponsorship	of	a	shared	peace,	Brexit	appears	to	be	dissolving	the
local	and	the	international	structure	of	reconciliation	in	Northern	Ireland,	creating	a	renewed	crisis	of	primary
national	interests	and	no	obvious	consensus	space	for	a	deeply	divided	society	like	Northern	Ireland.
Who	now	makes	reconciliation	a	priority,	and	what	happens	to	the	Good	Friday	Agreement	if	it	is	not?	
Superficially	nothing	has	yet	changed,	but	the	immediate	future	of	partnership	in	and	over	Northern	Ireland	may
now	depend	on	whether	sustaining	this	model	of	reconciliation	defines	the	shape	of	Brexit,	or	whether	a	specific
model	of	Brexit	is	applied	uniformly	to	define	relations	for	the	whole	UK	including	Northern	Ireland.		Crucially,
these	are	decisions	being	made	in	London.
All	of	a	sudden,	both	the	question	of	whether	reconciliation	in	Northern	Ireland	is	a	temporary	tactic	or	a	strategic
goal	–	and	whether	British	commitment	to	sovereignty	over	Northern	Ireland	is	itself	ultimately	a	tactical
‘management’	question	–	have	returned	as	matters	of	the	utmost	strategic,	selfish	interest.		The	question	of	what
is	the	tactic	and	what	is	the	goal	have	not	been	so	urgent	for	a	century.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Brexit	blog,	nor	the	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at
Democratic	Audit.
Professor	Duncan	Morrow	is	a	lecturer	in	politics	at	Ulster	University	and	has	published	widely	in	the	fields	of
conflict	resolution,	Northern	Ireland	politics	and	the	relationship	between	religion	and	politics.
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